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In New York Times Co. v. Sulhvan,I the United States Supreme Court held unani-
mously that a libel judgment under Alabama law 2 violated the first 3 and four-
teenth amendments4 to the United States Constitution. The New York Times case
has been evaluated by Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. as "the best and most impor-
tant [opinion the Court] has ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech." -5 In
response to an inquiry by Professor Kalven about the case, Professor Alexander
Meiklejohn, prominent proponent of the first amendment absolutist positioni is
reported to have expressed unqualified delight at the decision: "It is an occasion
for dancing in the streets."7
Although New York Tmes did, indeed, mark a significant event-the applica-
tion of constitutional limitations to the law of defamation as applied to public
officials-sober reflection reveals that the decision deserves a response somewhat
less euphoric than dancing in the streets. Whatever the implications for freedom
of political speech and expression, the New York Times case and its subsequent
modification in Gerlz v. Robert Welch, Inc.8 offer no first amendment protection to
one significant form of expression-literary works classified as fiction. New York
Times requires an inquiry into whether the alleged defamatory statement, which,
the plaintiff claims, relates to him, was made with actual malice-that is, with
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knowledge9 of its falsity or in reckless disregard for whether it was true or false.
Addressing as it does concepts of factual truth and falsehood, the test has no useful
application to the art of fiction. Although in a superficial sense all fiction is false
because it is invention rather than representation,10 the form known as fiction is
not equivalent to falsehood, "calculated" ' "I or inadvertent. Nor does it purport to
express literal truth. Therefore, to inquire in New York Times fashion into the
writer's conciousness in creating the fictional character identified by the plaintiff as
himself 2-to ask, "Did the writer realize he was falsifying?"-is to pose a mean-
ingless question. The author indeed realizes that what he is writing is fiction.
Unless he has conceived the portrayal in unadulterated admiration, his fictional
characterization will always risk the charge that it tends to defame. The outcome
will inevitably follow that the work can be deemed libelous by its very nature-
libelous because it is fiction.' 3
The point is demonstrated with exquisite clarity in Bindrim v. Mitchell, 14 a libel
action against the publisher and author of the novel Touching. 15 The California
Court of Appeal, holding the defendants to be joint tortfeasors, affirmed the trial
court's judgment for damages in favor of the plaintiff. 16 Faithful to the instruc-
tions of New York T imes, the court examined the record to determine whether there
was clear and convincing evidence that the characterization of the plaintiff which
tended to defame 17 was made with actual malice. 18 The court's review revealed
that defendant Gwen Davis Mitchell, a novelist, had been a participant in plaintiff
Paul Bindrim's "nude marathon" in group therapy. Two months after the event,
Doubleday advanced Mitchell $150,000 in royalties. Her novel, published later
that year, portrayed a Dr. Simon Herford conducting a nude encounter session.
9. The element of knowledge goes to the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the statement, not to
his knowledge of its defamatory character.
10. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 131, 233 N.E.2d 840, 845, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 838
(1967) (Bergan, J., dissenting).
11. Garrison v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
12. For discussion of the "of and concerning" requirement, see text accompanying notes 46-61 inqfa.
13. In Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill.2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970), a cause of action for invasion of pri-
vacy, the court recognized that the New York Times malice test does not apply to fiction.
Here, the motion picture, play and novel, while 'suggested' by the crime of the plaintiff, were evident-
ly fictional and dramatized materials and they were not represented to be otherwise. They were sub-
stantially creative works of fiction and would not be subject to the 'knowing or reckless falsity' or
actual malice standards ...
Id at 445, 259 N.E.2d at 256. (Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), applies the New York Times standard
to actions for invasion of privacy.) See also Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), ceri. denied, 42
U.S. 1062 (1977).
14. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
15. G. MITCHELL, TOUCHING (1971).
16. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 82, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (judgment modified to include joint and several
judgments against both defendants rather than separate judgments, and to include separate punitive dam-
ages against the publisher).
17. This is a threshold determination to be made by the court.
18. Bindrim permitted himself to be characterized as a public figure. Had he failed to acknowledge
that status, the question would have been determined by the trier of fact. If he had been found to be a
private figure, liability would have flowed from evidence of simple negligence on the part of the defend-
ants. The Bindrim dissent suggests that plaintiff's admission that he is a public figure "appears to be a
tactic to enhance his argument that any unflattering portrayal of this kind of therapy defames him." 92
Cal. App. 3d at 85, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 43 (Files, P.J., dissenting).
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Among other allegedly libelous incidents, Dr. Herford was depicted as displaying
brutal insensitivity to a patient. In support of Bindrim's allegation that his profes-
sional reputation had been injured, several witnesses who had been present at one
of the plaintiff's nude marathons testified that they identified Bindrim as Dr.
Herford. The jury was presented with excerpts from the novel's nude marathon
for comparison with Bindrim's tape recordings of actual sessions.' 9
The court dismissed the book's classification as fiction in a footnote: "The fact
that Touching was a novel does not necessarily insulate Mitchell from liability for
libel .... "20 Assuming that the novel contained defamatory falsehoods, the
court then concluded that the libelous statements were made with actual malice
because Mitchell had attended Bindrim's sessions, and knew the true facts; there-
fore, she wrote the novel with actual knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity.2 1
The court then addressed the issue of identification. 22 Paul Bindrim, Ph.D.,
was described by the court as clean shaven with short hair, while Simon Herford,
M.D., was pictured in the book as "a fat Santa Claus type with long white hair,
white sideburns, a cherubic rosy face, and rosy forearms." '23 Nevertheless, testi-
mony by three witnesses24 that the two therapists practiced the same variety of
therapy was sufficent to persuade the court that the reasonable person would iden-
tify the fictional character 25 as the plaintiff. From evidence that "the transcripts of
19. Bindrim had told Mitchell he would not admit her to the sessions if she intended to write about
the nude marathon in a novel. Two months before she signed the contract with Doubleday, Mitchell
executed an agreement with Bindrim that she would not divulge the happenings at the sessions. The trial
court struck the damage award on the contract count in Bbndri~n on the ground that Mitchell had acquired
the status of patient at Bindrim's sessions. The appellate court held that a professional person cannot by
contract prevent a patient from reporting the treatment received. Reprehensible as Mitchell's conduct
appeared to be, it should have had no influence on the resolution of the libel issue. Id. at 81, 155 Cal. Rptr.
at 41.
20. Id at 73 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 n.2. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 526, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), an action based on the right of publicity, where the court denied recovery and held that
"the reader of the novel .. .by the presence of the word 'novel' would know that the work was fictitious
21. The court found that plaintiff had not proved by clear and convincing evidence that Doubleday's
original hard-back publication was made with malice. Mitchell had been warned that the characters must
be wholly fictional and had assured her editor that the character in Touchbng could not be identified.
Mitchell's later assurance to Doubleday, after events had cast doubt on the book's accuracy, did not insu-
late Doubleday from liability. At that point, the publisher had a duty to investigate the possibility that
Touching defamed the plaintiff. Therefore, the punitive damage award was supported by evidence of
actual malice. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 73-74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
22. For discussion of the "of and concerning" requirement for libel, see text accompanying notes 46-61
infta.
23. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37. Bndrim had grown a beard by the time the trial took
place, a detail some observers interpreted as an effort to fit the description of Dr. Herford. Telephone
interview with Anthony Liebig, counsel for Gwen Davis Mitchell.
24. Herbert Otto, a friend and colleague of Bindrim's, testified that a dozen psychologists were con-
ducting nude marathons when Touchzng was published. Eleanor Hoover, a journalist trained as a psycholo-
gist and a friend of Mitchell, recognized Bindrim in the book because she knew Mitchell had gone to the
marathon and "immediately recognized what she had gone for." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 26,
Bindrim v. Mitchell, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979). Edward Hiler "attended the same nude marathon as
Mitchell and only read Touching after being told by Bindrim of the alleged identification and the lawsuit.
He testified that he looked upon the book as 'semifictional' and that one would have to know Bindrim to
recognize him." Id at 27.
25. The plaintiff did not dispute the book's classification as fiction. Amicus Brief at 4, Bindrim v.
Mitchell, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
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the actual encounter weekend show a close parallel between the narrative of
defendant's novel and the actual real life events,"' 26 the court concluded that
"there were many similarities between the character, Herford, and the plaintiff
Bindrim .... 27
Having found the required identification, the court posed the question, "Were
the statements in Touching libelous?" and answered in the affirmative. Plaintiff
alleged that he had been depicted as assaulting one patient and disturbing another
so severely that she was killed when her car crashed shortly after one session. The
court pronounced itself satisfied that the novel contained "substantially inaccurate
descriptions of what actually happened. . . . Some of these portrayals cast plain-
tiff in a disparaging light since they portray his language and conduct as crude,
aggressive and unprofessional." '28
If, as the dissent observed, "Those practices which are similar to plaintiff's tech-
nique are classified as identifying . . . [and] those which are unlike plaintiff's are
classified libelous because they are false," 29 the inevitable conclusion is that the
book is libelous for the simple reason that it is fiction. As Professor Kalven warned
in his assessment of New York Times, "There is revealed here a new technique by
which defamation might be endlessly manufactured. First, it is argued that, con-
trary to all appearances, a statement referred to the plaintiff; then, that it falsely
ascribed to the plaintiff something that he did not do, which should be rather easy
to prove about a statement that did not refer to plaintiff in the first place."'30
Bihdrim v. Mitchell is an example of the casuistry that results from the effort to
apply the present constitutional law of libel to the art of fiction. It demonstrates
that a work of fiction cannot be probed in the manner of New York Times with
constructive consequences. A work of fiction is, after all, an invention-an emana-
tion of the imagination, an artistic expression deriving from the complexity of
thought, emotion, sensibility and experience that comprises an author's conscious
and unconscious mode of perception. The writer of fiction, molding the material
of art-the events of exterior, interior and transcendant reality-has, as his task,
nothing less than the transformation of life, in whatever aspects he chooses, into
the realm of art. 3 1 Although novelists portray characters that have no apparent
resemblance to the recognizable participants in "real life," much that is fiction
necessarily derives from the events of the writer's life and, inevitably, from the lives
26. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
27. d at 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
28. Id at 77, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38. If Bindrim had sued Mitchell for invasion of privacy for placing
him in a false light in the public eye, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), would require proof con-
forming to New York Tzmes.
29. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 86, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (Files, P.J., Dissenting).
30. Kalven, supra note 5, at 199. Plaintiff Sullivan argued that although he was not mentioned in the
New York Times advertisement, he was identified by inference as the public official responsible for starving
students, assaulting Dr. King and bombing King's home. 376 U.S. at 258.
31. Although most literary artists achieve something less than historic significance in the endeavor,
"the major novelists.., not only change the posssibilities of the art for practitioners and readers, but ...
they are significant in terms of the human awareness they promote; awareness of the possibilities of life."F.
LEAVIS, THE GREAT TRADITION 10 (1954).
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of his relatives, friends, associates and acquaintances. William Somerset
Maugham put it this way:
[But] it is very seldom that life provides the writer with a ready-made story. Facts indeed
are often very tiresome. . . . [One] .. .must have the courage to throw . . . facts over-
board if they fail to comply with the logic of [the] character. . . . The writer does not copy
his originals; he takes what he wants from them, a few traits that have caught his attention,
a turn of mind that has fired his imagination, and therefrom constructs his character. He is
not concerned whether it is a truthful likeness; he is concerned only to create a plausible
harmony convenient for his own purposes. So different may be the finished product from
the original that it must be a common experience of authors to be accused of having drawn
a lifelike portrait of a certain person when they had in mind someone quite different.
3 2
Novelist and literary critic, E.M. Forster, described Marcel Proust as "an
author, rummaging in his past, disinterring forgotten facts, facts which exist again
for an instant before they crumble and are lost forever." Remarking upon that
"memory snatching [which has] produced a masterpiece, ' '33 Forster reminds us
that " 'life' and 'Proust' are not identical . . .-;34 nevertheless, "the main features
correspond . . .the work . . .expresses the spirit of our age."
35
It is this source of the fiction writer's material that is also the source of the art's
peculiar vulnerability to allegations of libel. If the main features of a contempo-
rary novelist's work correspond too closely to the facts of someone's life and too
little to the exemplary aspects of that life, a court can easily conclude that the
plaintiff in a libel action has been identified as the fictional character and defamed
by its portrayal. The plaintiff who is a public figure will have little difficulty
showing by clear and convincing proof that the writer harbored actual malice-
that the novelist knew what he was doing. The plaintiff who is a private figure
will similarly prevail with proof that the defendant engaged in negligent disregard
for the factual truth of the matter.36
This article addresses the predicament created for the art of fiction by the law
of libel and offers a possible solution that will provide first amendment freedom
of expression for the novelist and short story writer without obliterating the rights
of the allegedly defamed plaintiff. To accomplish this objective, the following will
be discussed: the law of defamation and the court's application of its principles to
fiction; the claim of fiction to first amendment protection; the sources of first
amendment protection for fiction; and an appropriate formula to resolve the con-
flict between the individual's right to the free expression of his artistic sensibility
and another individual's interest in the integrity of his reputation.
32. W.S. MAUGHAM, THE SUMMING UP 131-33 (1938).
33. E.M. FORSTER, ABINGER HARVEST 96 (1956).
34. Id at 91.
35. Id at 92.
36. For a discussion of the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between a public plaintiff and a
private plaintiff in defamation actions, see text accompanying notes 80-84 in7fra.
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II
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO FICTION
A. Historical Development of the Defamation Action
The law of defamation, which for one thousand years has protected the right of
the individual to be free from harm to his good name, expresses society's contin-
uing concern with the value of reputation and its commitment to the goal of
"preventing and redressing attacks."'3 7 The Laws of Alfred the Great (circa 880
A.D.) punished the proved slanderer in that the era's uncompromising style-by
cutting out his tongue. The ecclesiastical courts under William I required an act
of public penance from the sinner.38 Later remedies provided by the manorial
courts were limited to public apology by the slanderer and money damages for the
victim. By the sixteenth century, the common law courts provided for civil slander
actions and began to develop rules that we recognize as the modern American tort
action for defamation. 39
Until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, strict liability, that is, liability without a
showing of any fault on the part of the defendant, 40 was commonly imposed on a
showing that the allegedly defamatory statement "tends so to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him."' 4 1 Damages were not required to be
alleged or proved, but were presumed and awarded without any proof of actual
injury. Thus, the effect of the strict liability standard was "to place the printed,
written or spoken word in the same class" as such hazardous occupations as the
"use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals. '4 2
B. Significant Elements of the Tort Action Concerning a Work of Fiction
The elements of a prima facie case of libel are that the statement, capable of
being understood as defamatory 43 by a substantial and respectable group in the
community, 44 be communicated, 45 negligently or intentionally, by the defendant
37. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
38. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 53 (1978).
39. Lovell, The Reception of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1962). See also
Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 61 VA. L. REV.
1349, 1350 (1975).
40. Ordinarily, strict liability is imposed by public welfare statutes and is designed to protect unwary
members of the public from the danger implicit in potentially harmful activities (i'e., the food and drug
laws, the motor vehicle statutes, the antipollution regulations, the building codes). The practice of
imposing strict liability for libel was justified on the ground that proof of injury-proof that the plaintiff's
reputation in the community had been damaged by the statement-was exceedingly difficult to assemble.
See Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (Civ. App. 1934), Annot., 99
A.L.R. 864 (1935). One is reminded of the courts' anxiety that criminal conspiracies would go unpunished
if the prosecuter was put to the traditional burden of proof. "[T]he difficulties . ..of certainty in proof
. ..would become insuperable and conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity." Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1947).
41. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938).
42. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971).
43. As previously noted, the threshold determination is a matter for the court.
44. "Whether a person is lowered in the estimation of a respectable minority of the community is a
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to a third person who understands the statement to be both defamatory and "of
and concerning" the plaintiff.
Although the plaintiff is required to prove every element of the claim, a libel
action involving fiction actually turns on the issue of identification. 46 Once the
court makes the threshold determination that the so-called statement is capable of
a defamatory interpretation, it faces the crucial question: "Is the characterization
'of and concerning' the plaintiff?" The answer will determine the outcome of the
cause of action for it appears to follow that a fictional work, of and concerning the
plaintiff, is libelous by its very nature. If the author has created a fully-developed
character with certain flaws, some aspects of the portrayal will lower the now-
identified plaintiff in the esteem of some members of the community.
The characterization of the fictional Herford (in the novel Touching) is an
example. Once plaintiff Bindrim was identified as Herford, the court concluded
that the reasonable reader would understand the libelous passages "as reporting
actual language and conduct '47 and not "mere fictional embroidery. '48  Simi-
larly, a television drama of Al Capone's prison escape resulted in judgment for the
plaintiff,49 one of the prison officers guarding Capone at the time of the incident.
Plaintiffs name had not been used, nor were any physical resemblances suggested.
However, the court held that "the semi-fictional portrayal of a real life event is
fraught with the possibility that the public, or at least that segment of the public
that knows the plaintiff, will believe that the presentation refers to the plaintiff' 50
and awarded damages. In Kelly v. Loew's, 51 plaintiff Robert Kelly was identified as
the fictional character Rusty Ryan in the movie They Were Expendable5
2
because the movie was based on a book in which Kelly's true name was used.
Although the movie depicted the protagonist as kind, generous, humorous, coura-
geous, restrained and gallant, the court held he had been libelled because the char-
acter also was undisciplined, impatient, intemperate and emotional-
characteristics that would injure Kelly's reputation in the professional class of
naval officers.
On the other hand, where the court concludes that readers would not reason-
fact, and such people may be 'respectable people' regardless of whether their neighbors look upon them as
,right thinkers' or 'wrong thinkers'." ELDREDGE, supra note 38, § 9.
45. Slander is defamation which is spoken; libel is defamation which is written, printed, broadcast,
filmed, or which has acquired some other physical or tangible form. Id § 18.
46. Although Lord Mansfield's statement that "whatever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril,"
Corrigan v. Bobbs Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 63, 126 N.E. 260, 262 (1920), quoting Peck v. Tribune Co., 214
US 185, 189 (1909), can no longer be quoted with approval, courts announced themselves satisfied that the
plaintiff had been identified as the fictional character where the only similarity between art and life was
the wholly inadvertent use of the plaintiff's real name, E. Hulton Co. v. Jones, 26 T.L.R. 128, (1909), that
is where identification is a "concatenation of adventitious circumstances." Corrigan v. Bobbs Merrill Co.,
228 N.Y. at 65, 126 N.E. at 263. But see Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947), and Smith v.
Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
47. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
48. Id
49. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873
(1962).
50. Id at 243, 126 S.E.2d at 881.
51. 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
52. W. WHITE, THEY WERE EXPENDABLE (1942).
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ably identify the plaintiff as the fictional character for the reason that the work has
been classified as fiction, recovery is denied. In Wheeler v. Dell Pubhshing Co., Inc. 53
the court offered the rationalization that the reader would more likely conclude
that the unsavory character depicted in Anatomy of a Murder5 4 was deliberately "cre-
ated . . . in an ugly way so that none would identify her with [the plaintiff]. '55
The movie Primrose Path, made from a novel 56 written by an acquaintance of
the plaintiffs, was found to be sufficiently fictionalized so that the court could not
find that a considerable and respectable class of the community 57 would identify
the character. Similarly, the sordid experiences of a fictional character with the
plaintiffs name could not be attributed to the plaintiff because the book was quite
transparently a work of fiction. 58 Because the courts have failed to develop a suit-
able standard for fiction, the decisions exemplify irreconcilable positions. A court
may find that "[r]eputations may not be traduced with impunity. . .[even] under
the literary forms [sic] of a work of fiction,' 59 or may conclude that "no rational
reader could infer that the work attacked is anything but fiction."'60  At one
extreme, the plaintiffs claim, however tenuous, is honored with an award for dam-
ages. At the other extreme, the court has struck an even more astonishing pose
without acknowledging the significance of that conclusion or probing its import.
To dismiss a libel action with the offhand comment that the work is, after all, a
work of fiction amounts to a grant of absolute first amendment protection-abso-
lute immunity from libel actions to the writer of fiction. Although fiction has a
legitimate claim to first amendment protection, absolute immunity is a privilege
the United States Supreme Court has offered no other form of expression. 6 1
53. 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
54. R. TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1957).
55. 300 F.2d at 376.
56. V. LINCOLN, FEBRUARY HILL (1944).
57. Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639, 640 (D. Mass. 1944). See also Geisler v.
Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980); Polakoff v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 3 Med. L. Rptr. 2516
(Sup. Ct. N.Y.),aJdwithout opznion, 67 A.D.2d 871, appeal dismissed, 47 N.Y.2d 1011, 48 N.Y.2d 714 (1979).
58. Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947), stated the Minnesota law for libel in terms of
intent. See also Lyons v. New American Library, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 723, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 536 (1980).
59. Corrigan v. Bobbs Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. at 65, 12 N.E. at 262.
60. University of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Century Fox, 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, afd, 15
N.Y.2d 940 (1965), which involved a claim of invasion of privacy under the New York Civil Rights Law.
The court, classifying the work as fiction unconnected with actual happenings and characters at Notre
Dame, found it "deserving of substantial freedom." Id at 458, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 307, quoting Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). See also Toscani v. Hersey, 271 A.D.
445, 65 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1946); Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 157 F. Supp. 240 (D. Del. 1957); Leo-
pold v. Levin, 45 Ill.2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970); Buckley v. Vidal, 327 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
On the other hand, in Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 233 N.E. 840
(1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969), the New York Court of Appeals held that the New York
statute gave baseball pitcher Warren Spahn a right of action for invasion of privacy when he became the
subject of a fictionalized biography which was a distorted and fanciful portrayal of his life.
61. Professor Bork is among those who would exclude the novel from first amendment protection. "A
novel may have impact upon attitudes that affect politics, but it would not for that reason receive judicial
protection." Bork, Neutral %nciples andSome First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (1971).
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C. The Contribution of New York Tmes v. Sulh'van To The Law of Defamation
"Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." 62
For decades, strict liability was imposed in libel actions, without proof of fault
or actual injury, without regard for first amendment concerns. The New York
Times holding extended constitutional protection to some defendants in libel
actions. The complaint against the Times63 by Commissioner L. B. Sullivan of
Montgomery, Alabama, alleged that he had been libelled by an advertisement
carried by the Times. Although Sullivan's name had not been mentioned, he
claimed that he had been charged by inference with a variety of pugnacious activi-
ties. The Times acknowledged that some of the statements in the advertisement
were not factually accurate.
In his charge to the jury, the trial judge instructed that if the jury found that
the statements were made "of and concerning" the plaintiff, the Times could be
held liable because the statements were libelous per se (thus withdrawing that
question from the jury). The jury awarded Sullivan $500,00064 and the Supreme
Court of Alabama sustained the judgment, rejecting the Times' constitutional
objections on the grounds that the first amendment did not protect libelous
publications.
Inquiring whether the Alabama law of libel6 5 as applied to criticism of the
public conduct of a public official abridged the first and fourteenth amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and the press, the United States Supreme Court
stated that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limita-
tions." 66 Reiterating the country's "profound . . .commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials . . . ,",67 the Court recognized that
"erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need. . . to
survive.' "68 Therefore, speech could not be repressed simply because it was factu-
ally inaccurate and/or damaging to reputation. In addition, the Court noted that
the Alabama rule,69 by threatening the good faith critic of official conduct with
the peril of penalty should his facts turn out to be inaccuracies, produced the chil-
ling effect of self censorship 70 by "dampen[ing] the vigor and limit[ing] the variety
62. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964), quoting Judge Edgerton in Sweeney v.
Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942).
63. The Times was sued as editor and publisher along with four clergymen sued as sponsors of the
advertisement.
64. The court held that malice could be inferred from the Times' irresponsibility and its failure to
retract the statements.
65. ALA. CODE §§ 908-917 (1940) (current version at ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-180 to 189 (1975)).
66. 376 U.S. at 269.
67. Id at 270.
68. Id at 271-72.
69. The Alabama law reflected the tort rule then accepted in a majority of states.
70. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS IN TORTS 910-26, 930-38 (1959).
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of public debate."'7 1
The Court looked to the minority rule privilege for fair comment 72 for the
source of the new constitutional rule allowing for good faith error in publications
about public officials. The public official plaintiff in a libel action could no longer
prevail without clear and convincing evidence that the allegedly defamatory state-
ment was made with actual malice-with the defendant's knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false. The
duty of the Court, announced Justice Brennan, extends to reviewing the evidence
to determine whether it is clear and convincing as to the existence of actual malice.
The proof presented by Sullivan, said the Court, "lacks the convincing clarity
which the constitutional standard demands. '73
The malice rule of New York Tmes, far from providing a constitutional defense
to an action for libel in a work of fiction, offers negative messages to writers and
publishers of fiction. Once it is demonstrated that the work is "of and concerning"
the plaintiff, and therefore libelous, the conclusion will not be altered by an
inquiry into whether the work was published with knowledge of its factual falsity
or in reckless disregard for whether it was true or false. To phrase the inquiry in
that fashion is to ignore the crucial distinction between fiction and reportage-
that the fiction writer has not purported to present either factual truth or factual
falsehood-and to produce the astonishing result that the work was written with
actual malice.
Although generally the implications of New York Times are not encouraging to
writers and publishers of fiction, the Court's treatment of the "of and concerning"
requirement could provide some relief. In reviewing plaintiff's evidence, the Court
found that it did not support the finding that the allegedly libelous statements
were "of and concerning" the plaintiff because Sullivan's official position was
insufficient to identify him as the object of the criticism. To allow such an easy
identification would make it possible to transform abstract criticism of the govern-
ment into personal defamation and thus to impose a penalty on critical expres-
sion. 74 Although the Court's recognition does not directly pertain to fiction, it does
flag the necessity for exercising greater precision in analyzing the "of and con-
cerning" requirement. 75
Following New York Times, the Supreme Court defined the boundaries that
identified a public official, 76 classified official conduct 77 and broadened the class of
71. 376 U.S. at 279.
72. Coleman v. MacLennon, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). The Court held that malice could not be
presumed for the purpose of awarding general damages to the plaintiff-public official in a defamation
action. Nor did the provision for the defense of truth save the Alabama law, which, the court remarked,
had awarded Sullivan a judgment "without the need for any proof of actual pecuniary loss ... one thou-
sand times greater than the maximum fine provided by the Alabama criminal statute and one hundred
times greater than that provided by the Sedition Act." 376 U.S. at 277.
73. 376 U.S. at 285-86.
74. Id at 289-92. "This is a powerful point," writes Professor Kalven, wondering "why the Court did
not choose to rest on this issue alone . . . .[or] [c]onversely. .. felt compelled to add this second basis for
disposition." Kalven, supra note 5, at 204.
75. See text accompanying notes 131-35 infta.
76. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
77. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
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plaintiffs covered by the decision to include public figures78 as well as public offi-
cials. Then, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 79 the Court refused first amendment pro-
tection as outlined in New York Times to the defendant in a defamation action by a
private person who was neither a public official nor a public figure. 80 Although
the Court reiterated the position of New York Times that "[u]nder the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea,"8' the Court expressed its discomfort
with the principle. "But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's
interest in . . . debate .... "82 Recognizing the inevitability of false statements
in free exchange, the Court noted that although the first amendment requires pro-
tecting "some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters, 8* 3 the state's
interest in protecting the reputation of the private individual, who had neither
submitted himself to public scrutiny nor publicized his own viewpoint in the
media, outweighed the constitutional concern.8 4
Gertz withdraws any possibility of New York Times constitutional protection
from the writer of fiction who chooses a private person as protagonist. Further-
more, by focusing its emphasis on media defendants, the Court appears to commit
its interest in freedom of the press to the public benefit derived from the dissemina-
tion of information rather than the right to free expression. Thus far, New York
Times has been held to apply to a reporter8 5 and to a novelist 86 as defendants; the
degree of constitutional protection for writers of fiction has, however, not been
finally resolved.
III
THE CLAIM OF FICTION TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
To appreciate fiction's unique claim to constitutional protection, it is necessary
to examine the sources of the form, the perils the process invites and the value of its
78. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Subsequently, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), held that the rule of New York Times applied to allegedly defamatory statements
about a private individual if the statements concerned that individual's implication in some matter of
significance to the public. Justice Brennan, writing the opinion, focused on the public's interest in matters
of public affairs. "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so
merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'volunta-
rily' choose to become involved." Id at 43.
79. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
80. Recently the United States Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of public figure in holding
that the New York Tines rule did not apply to the director of research for a Michigan hospital who had
received $500,000 in federal research grants. Hutchinson v. Proximire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
81. 418 U.S. at 339.
82. Id at 340.
83. Id at 340-41.
84. Id at 343-48. The Court did, however, impose restrictions. Damages could not be presumed but
would be limited to awards for actual injury including out-of-pocket losses and impairment of reputation
and standing in the community, personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering "supported by
competent evidence." Id at 350. Nor could punitive damages be granted without a showing of actual
malice. Although the states could determine appropriate standards for the liability of publishers and
broadcasters, strict liability could not be imposed. In other words, a showing of simple negligence could
result in the imposition of liability.
85. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
86. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979).
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accomplishments. It is the obligation of the serious writer of fiction to accomplish
nothing less than the representation of life. "A novel is in its broadest definition a
personal, a direct impression of life: that, to begin with, constitutes its value
.... "87 "Humanity is immense, and reality has a myriad forms;" a8 the writer's
task is to select the material that is most compatible with, and evocative of, his skill
and talent. Classical fictional narrative-The Lives of Plutarch, the romances of
Alexander, the epic poems of Homer, Xenophon's history---developed historical
characters through the invention of everyday events, trivial thoughts, common-
place habits.8 9 "I must be allowed to devote myself mainly to the signs of the
psyche," wrote Plutarch, "and through these to represent each individual life
. . . -90 Thucydides, devoting himself to more heroic occasions, admitted that he
fictionalized events in the Peloponnesian War and invented suitable speeches for
the protagonists. 9 ' John Knowles plundered his life and the life of his family.9 2
Proust reached endlessly into his own mind and recreated his own past in his
search for the truths of experience. 93 Flaubert wrote, "Madame Bovary, c'est
moi. "94
The point, of course, is that the source of art is inevitably life, and it is the
source that embodies the particular danger that concerns this article-the peculiar
vulnerability of the fiction writer to allegations of defamation. 95 Whether or not
the artist's response to the charge will be persuasive may be a matter of historical
accident.
Responding to the accusation that he'd drawn a cruel caricature of Nathaniel
Hawthorne's sister-in-law, Miss Peabody, in his portrait of Miss Birdseye in The
Bostonians ,96 Henry James replied that the character was drawn "entirely from my
moral consciousness, like every other person I have ever known. '9 7 In explaining
the composite identity of his fictional characters, Proust wrote, "[T]here is not a
single invented character to whom he [the author] could not give sixty names of
people he has observed, of whom one poses for a grimace, another for an eye-glass,
another for his temper, another for a particular movement of his arms." 98
It is perhaps not inappropriate to articulate the obvious questions: What would
87. H. JAMES, THE ART OF FIcTIo N in THE PORTABLE HENRY JAMES 398 (1959).
88. Id. at 401.
89. R. SCHOLES & R. KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE, 57-81 (1966).
90. Id at 65, quoting Plutarch's Life of Alexander.
91. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (1960). Se SCHOLES & KELLOGG, supra
note 89, at 61-62.
92. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1981, § 7 (Book Review), at 3, 20.
93. E. M. FORSTER, supra note 33.
94. F. STEEGMULLER, FLAUBERT AND MADAME BOVARY: A DOUBLE PORTRAIT, 283 (1939).
95. "The whole business would be plain sailing if it were not for the susceptibilities of the persons
who serve as models for the author's characters. So colossal is human egotism that people who have
met an author are constantly on the lookout for portraits of themselves in his works and if they can
persuade themselves that such and such a character is drawn from them they are bitterly affronted if it
is drawn with any imperfections."
W. S. MAUGHAM, THE SUMMING UP 133 (1938).
96. H. JAMES, THE BOSTONIANS (1956).
97. L. EDEL, THE MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL NOVEL 115 (1964). Inquires Mr. Edel, "Is not a bird's
eye virtually a pea body?" Id
98. Id., quoting from PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST.
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have been the fate of The Bostonians had the passage of time not left Miss Peabody
comfortably ensconced in a previous century? How would Proust have fared had
Count Robert de Montesquiou, the prototype of Baron de Charlus,9 9 lived during
a more litigious era? Would the threat of costly litigation for damage to reputation
imposing "the pall of fear and timidity '' °° have silenced James and intimidated
Proust to the detriment of society?
In his discussion of Proust, Professor Edel reveals to us the achievement of
every major novelist and, by implication, the loss society would suffer were it
denied the literary artist.
[W]hat he [Proust] is revealing to us is the complexity of his subject, himself as a complex
being, and the complexity of the people he knew: that we are all in a sense composites of
parents and relations and memories, pastiches of the flesh, resembling now one person and
now another; that man is not one but many, and we thus obtain from Proust a sense of the
variousness and the depth of experience. In the technical sense Proust is writing autobi-
ographical fiction; in the larger sense he has created a synthesis that is art independent of its
creator. 10 1
If, then, the serious novelist's creation is a work of art that is larger than his life
and the lives of his creatures, it follows that society cannot disdain his contribu-
tion, but must foster the process. It requires no further justification to acknowledge
the unique claim of the novel form to constitutional protection. That the accom-
plishment of the minor novelist, the popular novelist or the bad novelist seems
slight in comparison with the dimensions of life is an inevitable hazard. It should
pose no more serious problem for the value of the fictional form than the utterance
of the false, inelegant or unpleasantly vehement statement poses for the advocates
of free political debate. According to Henry James, the value of the novel "is
greater or less according to the intensity of the [novelist's] impression [of life]. But
there will be no intensity at all, and therefore no value, unless there is freedom to
feel and say. "102
IV
THE SOURCES OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
A. Absolute Protection
The traditional absolutist position on the first amendment was expressed by
Justice Black, dissenting in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board: "the
Founders. . . gave the Government the fullest power to prosecute overt action in
violation of valid laws but withheld any power to punish people for nothing more
than advocacy of their views."' 1 3 According to Justice Douglas Dayler, concurring
in Gamson v. Louisiana, "[T]he only line drawn by the Constitution is between
'speech' on the one side and conduct or overt acts on the other."'' 0 4 These categor-
99. P. JULLIAN, PRINCE OF AESTHETES (J. Haylock & F. King trans. 1968).
100. 367 U.S. at 278. A recent article in The Natinal LawJournal inquiries, "When Does Libel Law
Intrude on Creativity?". June 8, 1981, at 2.
101. L. EDEL, supra note 97, at 116.
102. H. JAMES, supra note 87, at 398.
103. 367 U.S. 1, 168 (1961).
104. 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964).
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ical assertions do not mean that the proponents of the absolutist position on the
first amendment would extend absolute protection to fiction. 10 5 Although Mr.
Justice Black proclaimed that "I take no law abridging to mean no law abridging"
the freedom of speech and the press "without any ifs, buts, or whereases,"' 0 6 he
later qualified the scope of "an absolute, unconditional constitutional right" to say
what one pleases as applying to criticism about public affairs.'0 7 Insisting on the
privilege "to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from
excesses and abuses,"108 Mr. Justice Goldberg has noted that the constitutional
right to freedom of speech serves the ends of free political discussion, responsive
government and "the security of the Republic."' 0 9 Defamatory statements against
private persons are dismissed as having "little to do with the political ends of a self-
governing society."1 10 Professor Alexander Meiklejohn views the first amendment
as prohibiting the abridgment of the "freedom of a citizen's speech, press, peace-
able assembly, or petition, whenever those activities are utilized for the governing
of the nation." 1 1' Meiklejohn appears to assume a more expansive attitude toward
what constitutes a nation's governance, for he contends that the scope of first
amendment protection must extend to the freedom to vote and, thus, to all other
forms of human communication which nourish the voter's "knowledge, intelli-
gence, sensitivity to human values" and which embody "the capacity for sane and
objective judgment."' 12 Thus, Meiklejohn writes that "Literature and the arts
must be protected by the First Amendment. They lead the way toward sensitive
and informed appreciation and response to the values out of which the riches of
the general welfare are created."' 3
Although this statement rings with reassurance, Meiklejohn retreats consider-
ably from the so-called absolutist position by carving out exceptions to first
amendment protection for forms of communication that have no utility as activi-
ties of governing. While "the First Amendment offers no protection to the
defendant in a libel action for private defamation because the 'attack has no rela-
tion to the business of governing,' the same attack, if an expos6 of a candidate's
fitness for office, would be an act of 'a citizen's participation in government.' ,114
This is similar to the rationale expressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Gerlz. If, for example, a protagonist in a fictional work is depicted as the Riviera
jewel thief, there would be no constitutional defense to an action alleging the
defamatory characterization was "of and concerning" the plaintiff. If, on the
other hand, the jewel thief hero were revealed as the Attorney General of Cali-
fornia traveling incognito on a summer escapade, the defendant might utilize a
105. That is the position taken by the author of Comment, Defamation in Fzction: The Case For Absolute
First Amendment Protection, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 571 (1980).
106. Cahn,Justce Black andFtist Amendment 'Absolutes", 37 N.Y.U L. REV. 549, 559 (1962).
107. 376 U.S. at 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 298 (Goldberg, J. concurring).
109. Id. at 301, quoting Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)(Hughes, C. J.).
110. Id
111. Meiklejohn, supra note 6, at 256.
112. Id
113. Id at 257.
114. Id at 259.
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variation of the Meiklejohn theory to claim absolute first amendment protection.
Although it is likely that Professor Meiklejohn never pondered the relationship
between the art of literature and the law of libel, the application of his theory
produces irrational consequences. Whether or not literature "lead[s] the way...
to the values out of which the riches of the general welfare are created"' t depends,
in Meiklejohn's analysis, on the author's choice of a protagonist.
Despite the limited protection suggested by the traditional absolutists, some
courts seem almost unwittingly to have granted absolute immunity from actions
for libel to fiction, with the offhand comment that no one could possibly think the
work attacked was anything but invention."t 6 Professor Prosser actually said,
"Nor is there any liability when the plaintiff's character, occupation and the gen-
eral outline of his career, with many real incidents in his life, are used as the basis
for a figure in a novel who is still clearly a fictional one."' 17 Such a solution would
isolate fiction as the single genre to be granted absolute immunity, thus elevating it
above other forms of expression in its claim of privilege. If it is true that "the only
line drawn by the Constitution is between 'speech' on the one side and conduct or
overt acts on the other," 1 8 it is beyond argument that the category labelled speech
necessarily includes criticism of government, 1 9 political debate and advocacy of
the theoretical desirability of revolution. Until the United States Supreme Court
decides to expand its concept of freedom of speech, by extending absolute protec-
tion to political expression, a more limited protection for fiction must derive from
the unique qualities of the genre.
B. The Case for Fair Comment
There is significant utility in the common law defense of "fair comment" which
recognizes the necessity for public dissemination of information about public mat-
ters. The fair comment rule protects political and artistic criticism, t 20 extending
even to hyperbole and vitriolic satire as long as the comment is "not . . . exces-
sively vituperative."' 12 1 At common law the defense required evidence of three
factors-that the comment pertain to the activities of an individual in matters of
public concern; that it be fair in the sense that it represent the actual belief of the
critic; and that it have support in actual fact. 12 2 This minority rule was set forth in
Coleman v. MacLennon, 123 laying the foundation for the New York Times opinion. In
Coleman, a libel action was brought by a candidate for the office of State Attorney
115. Id at 257.
116. See notes 56 and 58 supra.
117. Prosser, .nacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 405 (1960). How would one determine that the figure is
still clearly a fictional one?
118. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964).
119. Professor Kalven makes this persuasive point: "Defamation of the government is an impossible
notion for a democracy .... The presence or absence in the law of the concept of seditious libel defines
the society. A society may or may not treat obscenity or contempt by publication as legal offenses without
altering its basic nature. If, however, it makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free society no matter
what its other characteristics." Kalven, supra note 5, at 205.
120. The cartoon Doonesbuiy by Garry Trudeau may be characterized as fair comment.
121. Smith v. Levitt, 227 F.2d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 1955).
122. W. PROSSER, supra note 42, at § 118.
123. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281. See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, § 118.
LIBEL AND FICTION
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
General for alleged defamation in an article about the candidate's conduct in con-
nection with a school fund transaction. In holding that a statement made in good
faith and without malice was privileged even if it were "untrue in fact and deroga-
tory to the character of the plaintiff,"'' 24 the court placed the burden of proof on
the plaintiff to show actual malice.
Professor Silver 12 5 urges the application of the fair comment doctrine to protect
that class of literature he calls "faction," novels in which public figures inhabit the
fictional world. Professor Silver's statement that "the invented action of a novel is
nothing more than the author's opinion of what a character would do under cer-
tain circumstances" 126 is persuasive where the only factual reality about the char-
acterization may be the use of a well-known name whom every reader would
identify in a context so unreal that no reader would imagine it was anything but
fantasy.2 7 Thus Richard Nixon may be portrayed seducing Ethel Rosenberg, par-
ticipating in an execution in Times Square and committing a public act of
sodomy.' 28 If, however, a fictional character modeled on an obscure personality
were occupied in similar endeavors, the writer would have no defense if he had
fleshed out the characterization with enough accurate detail to support the claim
that it was "of and concerning" the plaintiff. The issue becomes still more complex
when a writer of "faction" portrays a public figure in a context sufficiently similar
to reality that the reader is not alert to the distinction between fact and fancy. If,
for example, Senator Edward Kennedy is depicted as engaging in less dramatic
acts of sodomy, bribery and petty theft, the theory of fair comment may not be
entirely applicable. 129 If the fiction writer is to have a workable defense, it must
come from a doctrine more generally applicable than the fair comment rule.
C. The Requirement of Malice
Although New York Tmes provides no defense in a libel action against the
writer of fiction, the decision did suggest to this writer a possible variation of the
standard: Did the author fashion the fictional character with the knowledge that
the plaintiff would be identified to his detriment or, in the alternative, in reckless
disregard of the likelihood of that result? Such an inquiry may have considerable
significance, but it is only one aspect of the broader test for defamation. To
emphasize too strongly the writer's awareness of the effect a work may have on the
reader requires the writer to ponder whether some number of readers will pierce
the fictional veil to the damage of the plaintiffs reputation. Excessive speculation
of this sort is no more useful than preoccupation with the reception the work will
have at the hands of the critics. It can only inhibit the creative process, casting a
124. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
125. Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths" of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (1978).
126. Id. at 1069.
127. Professor Silver's words are fabulism and super-burlesque. id
128. R. COOVER, THE PUBLIc BURNING (1977).
129. However, in Frosch v. Grosset and Dunlap, Inc., 4 Med. L. Rptr. 2307 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979),
at'd, 75 A.D. 2d 768 (1980), a cause of action based on the right of publicity, the court, in denying
recovery, considered the fictionalized account of Marilyn Monroe's life to be the author, Norman Mailer's,
"fair comment"! See text accompanying notes 113-22 supra.
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"pall of fear and timidity"' 30 on the writer of fiction.
V
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. The Proposed Standard
As demonstrated above, the unique character of the literary form of fiction
requires a defense tailored to its characteristics. It is proposed that in an action for
libel, the following three-part test be applied to determine if the plaintiff may
recover:
1. Has the plaintiff been identified to his detriment?
2. Is the work fiction?
3. Was the characterization intended to defame the plaintiff?.
1. Has the Plaintif Been Identifted to His Detriment? Although the claim that a
work is fiction could ultimately dispose of the likelihood that it is "of and con-
cerning" any actual person, there is considerable utility in retaining the traditional
inquiry: Does the fictional character display qualities that support the plaintiff's
claim? The test must be not whether any reader would, by a stretch of the imagi-
nation, confuse art with life, but whether the reasonable reader would conclude
that the plaintiff had been identified.
The courts' past resolution of the identification inquiry has produced varying
results. The novel, The Travelers'3 ' depicted a family identical in minute detail
with the plaintiff's family: a minister father and his thirteen children who toured
Europe by bus, giving concerts as a family band and choir. There can be little
quarrel with the court's holding that this evidence was sufficient to save the plain-
tiff from summary judgment. 32 The result in Bindrim appears less persuasive.
Three witnesses testified that they recognized the fictional Dr. Herford as Bindrim
solely on the basis of the similarity in the nude encounters. The court's statement
that a "reasonable person reading the book would understand that . . . [he] . . .
was in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described"' 133 is by no means a necessary
conclusion.
The trial court's duty must include an instruction to the jury that identification
cannot be found unless it appears to be both reasonable and made in good faith.
A finding of unreasonable identification---e.g., that Bindrim's colleagues believed
Herford was Bindrim-might imply a lack of good faith. In any case, a finding of
either unreasonableness or a lack of good faith would end the inquiry and justify
judgment for the defendant.
The problem of injury presents the next difficulty. Only if the witness can
testify that he recognizes the fictional character as the plaintiff and, further, that
the characterization has damaged the plaintiff's reputation in some specific and
130. 376 U.S. at 278.
131. A. FETLER, THE TRAVELER (1965).
132. Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966).
133. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39.
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substantial way 134 would the jury be justified in finding defamation. In the usual
case, however, plaintiffs reputation has not been damaged in the minds of plain-
tiffs witnesses but has, in fact, been preserved. They realize that the characteris-
tics ascribed to the fictional character have been invented. 135 The issue of injury
cannot be allowed to turn on the impression the novel could make on the hypo-
thetical reader who knows the plaintiff well enough to identify him, but not well
enough to sort fact from fancy. This solution would allow the jury, persuaded that
the plaintiff had been identified, to conclude from their ignorance that the char-
acter was the plaintiff "acting as described." If such reasoning is permitted, those
characteristics similar to plaintiffs would identify him; those characteristics which
are dissimilar would defame him. Such an analysis is no more productive than an
analysis of the fiction writer's knowledge of the falsehood of his story. Damage to
the plaintiffs reputation in the mind of the identifying witness must be
demonstrated.
In the unlikely event that there is clear and convincing evidence that the rea-
sonable reader, forming a substantial segment of the population, believes the
plaintiff is the protagonist "acting as described," it is nonetheless necessary to con-
tinue the inquiry and intrude the crucial question: Is the work fiction?
2. Is the Work Fiction? The central issue that must be determined is whether the
allegedly defamatory work is fiction, or reportage thinly disguised as fiction.
Although this. question may have evoked a ready response in more stable times
when literary forms occupied clearly separable niches, it becomes more difficult to
distinguish fiction from nonfiction in an era that has produced the journalistic
novel, novelistic journalism, 3 6 and docu-dramas. 137 The central quality and the
essential power of fiction is that it transforms reality. However evocative of the
details of everyday life, however true to someone's real life the protagonist appears,
it is the achievement of fiction that it penetrates, extends and records what we
understand to be exterior reality. The writer's next door neighbor can thus
become a Madame Bovary. t 38 A woman encountered on a Manhattan ferryboat
develops into the heroine of a Joyce Cary novel.' 3 9 A pamphlet describing the
trial of Beauchamp becomes World Enough and Time. 140
Whether or not real life is sufficiently transformed into art is not settled by a
court's assertion that no one could imagine the work to be anything but fiction. It
can only be determined by the writer's statement and the critics' opinions. The
134. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), allows an award for damages for emotional
distress without proof of damage to reputation.
135. Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 77 A.D. 2d 501 (1980), denied the plaintiff
recovery stating, "[h]e knows of no one who believes he was a child molester or thinks less of him due to the
publication." Id at 502.
136. T. CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD (1966); T. CAPOTE, Music FOR CHAMELEONS (1975).
137. F. Wiseman, Tiicul Folhs (television documentary). See Commonwealth v. F. Wiseman, 356
Mass. 251, 249 N.E. 2d 610, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
138. Emma Bovary developed as a composite of three women: Mme. Delamare, Louise Colet and
Mme. Pradier. F. STEEGMULLER, supra note 94, at 282-83.
139. M. COWLEY, WRITERS AT WORK 7 (1959).
140. ROBERT PENN WARREN, WORLD ENOUGH AND TIME (1979).
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writer's boilerplate disclaimer that "The characters in this epic are purely fictional
and any resemblance to actual persons living or dead is purely coincidental"'' 41 is,
of course, insufficiently persuasive and, further, vulnerable to contradiction. The
defendant author in Feler v. Houghton MzJ5fh asserted that the characters in his
novel were fictional but his brother, the plaintiff, testified that the author admitted
he wrote "about our father, the family concerts and me."' 142 On the other hand,
Meyer Levin, author of Compulsion 143 has stated quite convincingly that "though
the action is taken from reality, it must be recognized that thoughts and emotions
described in the characters come from within the author . . . . Some scenes are
. . . total interpolations, and some of my personages have no correspondance to
persons in the case in question."' 14 4 Concluded the court, "neither the author of
the book nor the producer of the film has attempted anything but to tell a dra-
matic story."' 14 5
The literary critics offer a variety of insights into the essence, the objectives and
the function of fiction. In the era of Virginia Woolf, "a novelist . . . existed to
serve the world as its dispassionate observer."' 14 6 Wright Morris tells us,
[Fiction] provides that link in the chain of awareness that relates man to the urmensch of
his subconcious. . . . [W]hat is written, with deliberation, and marketed as short stories,
tall tales and novels, [is] . . . crafted to please the writer in such a manner that it holds the
reader, frequently against his will. This artfully crafted illusion provides literate men with
a measure of the shrinkage and expansion of human consciousness, and such a commentary
as we have and value on the disordered state of the human soul. It also entertains, distracts,
diverts, deludes, corrupts, and cheats. 147
At another moment, Morris wrote, "Fiction is over there on the wall to the left;
nonfiction to the right."' 48
Although literary criticism is, to be sure, no more precise an area than criticism
of the law, we depend on the critics for their insights. Determining whether a work
is fiction is no more onerous or imponderable a task than many issues that require
the evaluation of expert testimony. 49 When the question of the work's classifica-
tion is disputed, both plaintiff and defendant may offer expert critical opinion and
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564, comment d (1965).
d. Fictitious character. A libel may be published of an actual person by a story or essay, novel, play or
moving picture that is intended to deal only with fictitious characters if the characters or plot bear
such a resemblance to actual persons or events as to make it reasonable for its readers or audience to
understand that a particular character is intended to portray that person. Mere similarity of name
alone is not enough; nor is it enough that the readers of a novel or the audience of a play or a moving
picture recognize one of the characters as resembling an actual person, unless they also reasonably
believe that the character is intended to portray that person. If the work is reasonably understood as
portraying an actual person, it is not decisive that the author or playwright did not so intend ...
The fact that the author or producer states that his work is exclusively one of fiction and in no sense
applicable to living persons is not decisive if readers actually and reasonably understand otherwise.
Such a statement, however, is a factor to be considered by the jury in determining whether readers did
so understand it, or, if so, whether the understanding was reasonable.
142. 364 F.2d at 651.
143. M. LEVIN, COMPULSION (1956).
144. Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 437, 259 N.E.2d 250, 252 (1970).
145. Id at 438, 259 N.E.2d at 253.
146. S. CAHILL, WOMEN AND FICTION xi (1975).
147. W. MORRIS, ABOUT FICTION 7-8 (1975).
148. Id at 2.
149. Was the criminal defendant's act committed while his capacity was diminished? Did the corn-
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the trier of fact will determine which side has proved its point. Had the novel
Touching been subjected to an appropriate inquiry, one might speculate that the
plaintiff's witnesses would testify that the book was simply a reportorial account of
the experiences of the first person writer: impressions of the people she met at
Bindrim's nude encounter, descriptions of real life events she had witnessed-for
example, the vigil at San Quentin on the night of the Caryl Chessman execution.
Defendant's witnesses would offer the opinion that Touching is a story of the deteri-
oration of an apparently healthy young woman presented, however clumsily,
through the envelope device of the first person observer. That some of the events
may actually have occurred would not detract from the author's effort to infuse
them with her heroine's perceptions and thus to develop her character. The wit-
ness could be expected to conclude that the book is a work of fiction. If it is, as
well, a work badly flawed-pretentious, rambling, crude-it must be remembered
that "What seems to one to be trash may have for others fleeting or even enduring
values."15
0
At this point, it becomes necessary to balance the novelist's interest in freedom
of expression, the freedom to use the material of his experience in the service of his
art, against the interest of the private individual who happens to inhabit the
writer's experience, in protecting his reputation from injury. The balancing sug-
gested is not ad hoc balancing, 15 1 weighing the particular interests posed by the
facts of each case to determine which litigant the scales shall favor. Rather, it is "a
weighing of considerations" 1 52 to arrive at a definitive factor that will enable the
court to determine when a form of expression known as fiction is to be classified as
speech deserving first amendment protection. This crucial factor is intent.
3. Was the Characterization Intended to Defame the Plaintir.153  The New York Times
decision recognizes the significance of the declarant's state of mind in its require-
ment of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice before the imposition of
liability. Since the New York Times standard is inapplicable to works of fiction, the
question of intent in this area requires a determination of whether the writer-
defendant intended to mold the material of his art into literary work or, on the
other hand, to utilize his skill as a novelist in order to defame the plaintiff. In
other words, did the writer intend that the reader identify the plaintiff and attri-
bute the fictional aspects of the character to him? Proof of intent is, of course,
pany's employment practices constitute the creation of a "suspect classification"? What is the worth of a
young man's life to the parent-plaintiff in a wrongful death action?
150. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946). It is not suggested that the court engage in
evaluating the work's redeeming qualities.
151. "The formula is that the court must, in each case, balance the individual and social interest in
freedom of expression against the social interest sought by the regulation which restricts expression."
Emerson, Toward A General Theogy of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912 (1963).
152. Id at 916.
153. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), a constitutional challenge to an Ohio statute prohib-
iting the advocacy of violence, fashioned a similar test. Brandenburg held that punishment for mere advo-
cacy of the use of force was an unconstitutional intrusion on freedom of expression unless it was directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and was likely to do so.
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never a simple matter. Nevertheless, it is possible to arrive at a conclusion about
the author's intent by evaluating the following:
a. The writer's attitude toward the character as demonstrated in the work
itself.
b. The connection between the writer and the plaintiff.
c. The author's reputation.
a. The writers attitude toward the character as demonstrated i'n the work itself If the
writer has endowed his protagonist with the physical, emotional and mental quali-
ties of the plaintiff and portrayed the plaintiffs real world in precise detail, the
implication is that the writer intended to identify the plaintiff or that he proceeded
in reckless disregard of the likelihood of that identification. Therefore, the intent to
defame may be inferred from the accumulation of unsavory details.
In Corrigan v. Bobbs Merril, Co. ,154 the protagonist of "Justice a la Cornigan," a
chapter in the sensational novel God's Man, 5 5 sat as a magistrate in plaintiff Judge
Corrigan's actual court, Jefferson Market Court in New York City. "The inference
• . . is unmistakably that the author Howard intended. . . deliberately and with
personal malice to vilify plaintiff, under the barely fictitious name of Cornigan
• . . as being ignorant, brutal, hypocritical, corrupt, shunned by his fellows, bestial
of countenance, unjust, dominated by political influence. . . and grossly unfit for
his place."1 56 In contrast to the portrayal of Judge Cornigan, the character of
Herford, who appears as insensitive, coarse and manipulative in the novel
Touching, bears no resemblance to plaintiff Bindrim. Further, he is an incidental
character rather than a protagonist, cast by the author in a stereotypical role so
that he becomes a mere stick figure, a product of the place and the times (the hip
West Coast in the 1970's), and useful for the author's artistic purpose-the revela-
tion of Soralee's character. In Cason v. Baskzn,i 5 7 the author describes "my friend
Zelma" in the book Cross County as "an ageless spinster resembling an angry and
efficient canary."' 58 Though the author states, "I cannot decide whether she
should have been a man or a mother. She combines the more violent characteris-
tics of both,"'159 the characterization is, on the whole, admiring. Such admiration
would usually serve to disprove the existence of intent.
b. The connection between the writer and the plaittiff The thrust of this question
is to penetrate the writer's motive. Where the relationship has been public, the
issue is easily resolved. The author of God's Man,' 60 in which the chapter "Justice a
la Cornigan" appeared, had come before Judge Corrigan on a criminal charge and
witnesses testified he was getting even with the plaintiff. Similarly, an examina-
tion of the novel Touching reveals evidence that may be damaging to the writer.
154. 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920).
155. G.B. HOWARD, GOD'S MAN 145-255 (1915).
156. 228 N.Y. at 62-63, 126 N.E. at 262. The author, George Bronson Howard, was not served and
did not appear. The holding in Corrgan was not based on intent; rather, the court imposed strict liability
on the publisher.
157. 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1945). Cason v. Baskin was an action for invasion of privacy.
158. Id at 202, 20 So. 2d at 243.
159. Id at 206, 20 So. 2d at 247.
160. G.B. HOWARD, supra note 155.
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Gwen Davis Mitchell had participated in Bindrim's nude marathon after having
executed an agreement that she would not reveal anything that might happen.
The first person narrator in the novel exposes her plan to the reader: "Naturally I
intended to protect my journalistic flank-not revealing their names, of course,
that would be dishonest and opening the magazine to threats of libel. But if any-
thing occurred that was actually outrageous I fully intended to report it as such
and not use Herford's name." 16 '
On the other hand, there was no evidence indicating an improper motive on
the part of Meyer Levin, author of Compulsion,162 or of Robert Traver, author of
Anatomy of a Murder. 163 Both novels were based on crimes with which the authors
had some connection. Meyer Levin had been a fellow student of defendants Loeb
and Leopold and a newspaper reporter in Chicago at the time of the notorious
crime for which they were tried. Robert Traver was the pseudonym of John
Voelker, the attorney who represented the defendant in the murder he later
fictionalized. A case requiring deeper analysis is presented by Feller v. Houghton
Mtiin ,164 where the novelist made his family history into fiction. The events and
emotions depicted in such a novel must be studied to determine whether the
author's objective was to capture and, perhaps, transcend his experience or, rather,
to ridicule his family, vent his animosity or vindicate himself for real or imagined
wrongs.
c. The author's reputation. Although the author's reputation as a professional
does not immunize him from either a malicious desire to defame or a finding that
he had intentionally defamed the plaintiff, it should be noted that writer-
defendant Meyer Levin was a well known journalist; Gwen Davis Mitchell was the
author of six books. The author's reputation, that is, his prior accomplishment, is
of course relevant as evidence of his professional commitment and his credibility.
It is also probative of his sophistication. Although it might not be appropriate to
hold the knowledgeable author to a stricter standard of care than that required of
the novice, the knowledge of the experienced author, as it pertains to the problem
of libel and fiction, is surely to be considered in examination of his intent.
The effort to establish reputation has of course been known to backfire. In the
second trial of Cason v. Baskn ,16.5 forty witnesses, most appearing for the defendant,
testified over a period of eight days. Innumerable documents, including book
reviews and a copy of Who's Who, were offered to show that the defendant was the
well-known writer of a novel that had been called a minor American classic, that
her reputation was international and that she had been the recipient of several
honorary degrees. Said the judge, "[t]he whole force and trend of the defendant's
evidence was to exalt and praise the defendant and to establish her great promi-
nence when that was not an issue in the case."' 16 6
161. G. MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 17.
162. M. LEVIN, supra note 143.
163. R. TRAVER, supra note 54.
164. Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966).
165. 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947).
166. Id at 40, 30 So. 2d at 640.
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B. Publisher/Producer Liability
Although the focus of this article has been on the plight of the writer of fiction,
he will, of course, be joined in an action with the publisher or producer. If it is
demonstrated that the fictional work was written with the intent to defame the
plaintiff,16 7 it does not follow that the writer's intent must be imputed to the pub-
lisher. Rather, a variation of the New York Times test applies to this situation: Did
the publisher publish the work with knowledge that the author intended to defame
the plaintiff or in reckless disregard of the defamatory intent?
Publishers commonly discuss the problem of libel with authors and read manu-
scripts with an eye for detecting potential liability. It should pose no unreasonable
hardship to require the publisher to undertake the task of evaluating the writer's
intent in terms of the guidelines suggested here-that is, to examine the possibility
that the work has depicted a potential plaintiff and to determine whether the work
is, indeed, fiction rather than thinly disguised fact; to scrutinize the work for its
revelation of the writer's attitude toward a potential plaintiff; and to investigate
the writer's actual connection with the fictionalized character for evidence of
intent to defame.
If the publisher is satisfied that the writer's intent is not defamatory, the pub-
lisher cannot be charged with malice in the publication. If, however, the potential
plaintiff informs the publisher that he has been identified in the work and defamed
by the characterization, as Dr. Bindrim notified Doubleday, the publisher is put
on notice to conduct further investigation.168 His liability does not derive from an
imputation of the writer's intent. 169 Rather, he will become liable on a showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the work, written with the requisite intent, was
published with knowledge of its intent or in reckless disregard for whether or not
the intent was defamatory.
VI
CONCLUSION
The constitutional standards established by New York Tines Co. and Gertz offer
insufficient first amendment protection to works of fiction. To determine that the
character of a fictional personage bears similarities to the plaintiff who is, there-
fore, identifiable, and then to find the characterization libelous because of the
unflattering dissimilarities is a senseless endeavor. To follow that logic with an
inquiry into the writer's actual knowledge of the falsity of his "statement" is to
compound unreason with futility.
167. The question "Is it fiction?" applies to the work itself and offers no impediment to the potential
imposition of liability on both writer and publisher. It is presumably a legitimate aspect of the publisher's
responsibility to classify works in production.
168. In applying the New York Times malice rule, the Bindrnim court found insufficient evidence that
Doubleday editors entertained doubts about the "truth" of the events depicted prior to the publication of
the hardback book. There was, therefore, no duty to conduct further investigation until the Company
contemplated the paperback publication. By that time, Bindrim had put Doubleday on notice.
169. In a libel action the liability of the publisher for the writer's act is not vicarious, but independent.
Each publication of a libelous statement is a republication.
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Since the literary form known as fiction must surely enjoy first amendment
protection as freedom of expression, it is necessary to devise a test appropriate to
the genre. This writer suggests a three-part inquiry:
1. Has the plaintiff satisfied appropriate standards for a demonstration that
the characterization was recognized as the plaintiff?
2. Is the work fiction?
3. Was the fictional characterization intended to injure the plaintiff's
reputation?
Under this standard, if the work is worthy of classification as fiction, it cannot
be held to be libelous unless the characterization, of and concerning the plaintiff,
injured his reputation and there is clear and convincing evidence that the writer's
intention was to defame the plaintiff.
